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1. Introduction:  
During the last decade, a rapidly expanding interest in the relationship between natural 
resource abundance and economic growth for low and middle income countries has generated 
debate among scholars and policymakers alike. The “resource curse”1 has become a term 
associated with the abundance of natural resources and a lagging performance of countries 
with large endowments of natural resources such as oil, natural gas, mineral, diamond, etc, 
compared to countries with fewer resources. Paradoxically, despite the prospects of wealth 
and opportunity that accompany the discovery and extraction of nonrenewable natural 
resources, such endowments often impede rather than further promote sustainable social, 
economic development, good governance, income equality and democracy. The curse is 
exemplified by the fall of average per capita income for the oil exporting countries by 29 % 
over the period 1975-2000 compared to the rest of the world whose average per capita income 
has increased by 34 % during the same period ( Nili and Rastad ,2007). The effect is more 
apparent in countries that lack strong institutional foundation especially law enforcement, 
defined property rights laws and counter rent-seeking regulations. Meanwhile, the lack of 
natural resources has not been an obstacle to economic success as experienced by the Asian 
Tigers specially Taiwan, Singapore and Korea who managed to base their economic growth 
on a booming manufacturing industry and export sector without large natural resource 
reserves ( Sachs and Warner, 1995).  
While the literature provides several explanations to the curse and considerable empirical 
evidence on the negative association between natural  resource abundance/dependence and 
various negative development outcomes, this evidence is by no means conclusive ( see e.g. 
Sachs and Warner 1995, 2001; Auty 2001; and Gylfason 2001). Resource endowment by 
itself is not a negative factor. Even countries in the same geographic area would exhibit 
heterogeneous characteristics specially when it comes to managing their resource wealth, as is 
the case in Middle East and North Africa ( MENA). Several factors contribute to the ability to 
realize gains from natural resources and the associated rents which countries like Botswana 
and Norway have managed to adopt to turn the curse into a blessing. The role of good 
economic and political institutions is emphasized to be a crucial determinant to the degree of 
                                                             
1 The term “resource curse” was first used  by British economist Richard Auty in 1993, who is the pioneer on the 
topic  
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success to appropriate rent gains and counter any expected negative effects ( Boschini, 
Pettersson, & Roine , 2007)  
An important institution based on contractual trust and information is financial sector 
development , is strongly linked to enhanced economic growth, development, and 
diversification. An efficient financial market identifies investment opportunities , channels 
domestic funds to the private sector ( mobilize savings), promotes innovation, exerts corporate 
control, facilitates risk management and therefore contributes to poverty and inequality 
reduction policies (Rajan,1998)
2
. Therefore, a well functioning financial market is a 
prerequisite for economic growth in both developed and developing countries. The finance – 
growth relationship has primarily focused on cross country evidence excluding resource rich 
countries which may have a different financial structure ( Beck, 2011). An important link 
between financial development and natural resources is that resource rents or revenues can act 
as a substitute for private saving. Therefore if the financial structure is weak in resource rich 
countries, different forms of distortions could arise in the economy  as a result of reinforcing 
the adverse effects of resource curse such as the inefficiency of investments. Moreover, a well 
developed financial system is likely to act as a buffer to fluctuations in world prices to which 
resource rich countries are vulnerable and are thus likely to better absorb shocks (Denizer, 
Iyigun & Owen, 2000). 
Despite the vast literature on the effect of institutional quality on the natural resource curse; to 
the best of our knowledge, previous studies have paid little attention to the effect of natural 
resource abundance on financial development and to how institutions play a role in mitigating 
this effect. The Middle East and North Africa region ( hereafter MENA ) is an interesting case 
to test the theoretical and institutional hypothesis in the literature that tackled this issue, with 
sometimes conflicting results. The region is endowed with abundant natural resources 
(specifically minerals, oil and natural gas)
3
 but with stagnating growth in real GDP per capita 
between 1980 and 2000, as other comparable regions have outperformed them with overage 
annual growth of 4.1 percent in east Asia and 0.3 percent in all other developing countries 
over the same period ( Hakura, 2004). In addition, MENA  is a region characterized by 
                                                             
2 For a thorough review of the finance- growth literature, see Nili & Rastad, 2007; Beck & Levine, 2004; 
Benhabib & Spiegel, 2000; Levine et al., 2000). 
3 MENA possess 55% and 29% of global oil and natural gas reserves respectively  (Arezki et al., 2012) in addition 
oil-poor Arab countries have achieved a higher GDP per capita growth rate during the period 1961-2001 , 
averaging 2.5 % compared to only 1.4 % for the oil-rich economies 
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consistently negative saving rate and high dependence on natural resource extraction 
compared to other regions during the period ( 1980-2010)
4
. The average natural resource rents 
as a percentage of GDP is by far higher than any other region in the world. For example, the 
average resource rents in 2005-2010  in MENA reached 35.58% compared to 10.30% in Sub-
Sahara, followed by Latin America and Caribbean with 10.02% , and last is East Asia, Pacific 
and Europe with an average share of 3.75% and 3.61% respectively (World Development 
Indicators,2012)    
Meanwhile, the financial sector is relatively weak which is reflected in inadequate banking 
competition, lack of alternative banking institutions for finance ,limited coverage of credit 
information and weak creditor rights. Banks focus on large and well connected enterprises at 
the expense of small and medium enterprises can undermine the potential of growth ( World 
Bank, 2011). Relatively low and non-inclusive growth, and high levels of  macroeconomic 
volatility for the period 1970 – 2008 is what characterizes resource rich countries in MENA 
(Arzeki & Nabli, 2012) as they followed a mineral-led development model based on 
inefficient state intervention, concentration of state owned banks and dependency on external 
windfalls.  
This paper extends the debate on the resource curse by focusing on an under researched 
mechanism which is financial development. Acknowledging heterogeneity of the region in 
terms of the resource abundance and degree of dependence, we provide a better understanding 
of the different levels of financial development in MENA through links related to natural 
resource wealth especially oil and minerals. In specific, we aim at answering , what is the 
impact of natural resource dependence on financial development in the region ? . To achieve 
a more thorough analysis of the financial sector , we focus on three characteristics of the 
financial sector: financial depth, efficiency and stability. Furthermore, we exploit the rich 
theoretical and empirical literature on the importance of institutional quality for financial 
development to extend the research a step further. Particularly, to what extent does 
institutional quality matter for the relationship between resource dependence and financial 
development?.  
The analysis is conducted on a panel of 17 countries from the region for the period 1980 – 
2009 using intervals of 5 years average due to availability of data and institutional change in 
                                                             
4 Refer to Figures (1A) and (2A) respectively in Appendix for a graphical elaboration  
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the oil industry that dictated government control of the resource returns. Initially, we conduct 
a pooled ordinary least square (OLS) regression of  resource dependence first on the different 
indicators of financial depth, efficiency and stability; followed by testing the resource 
abundance variables in the same manner as before. Finally, we apply a fixed effect model for 
a better specification to overcome some drawbacks of the pooled OLS estimation. The 
theoretical framework for our purpose is the one provided by Beck (2011) , who provided the 
seminal work on our topic. 
The contribution of the research is fourfold : First, the link established between financial 
development and natural resources provides a new explanation for the different levels of 
financial development across the region, which may influence the pace of economic growth.  
We are inspired by theory and empirics to carry out this research in a new light as no previous 
paper has linked the three elements of financial development, natural resources and 
institutions together in one investigation. Thus , our study is an initial effort to fill this gap by 
focusing on MENA. Second, it adds to the literature on the determinants of financial 
development with specific focus on role of natural resources and institutions in MENA. Third, 
the present paper introduces methodological and data improvements over previous studies. 
We go beyond conventional measures of financial development that only focus on 
intermediary size or activity and include other aspects crucial to the financial sector like 
intermediary efficiency and stability to assess potential links with resource dependence and 
abundance. We thus provide a holistic assessment of the financial sector with the use of a 
wide variety of indicators. Fourth, we make an explicit distinction between resource 
abundance and resource dependence; guided by Isham , Woolcock, Pritchett & Busby (2002) 
and Stijns (2005) who find positive growth effects from resource abundance but the opposite 
from resource dependence. Consequently, we test the effect of both terms successively on our 
financial development measures. In addition, we include an institutional quality variable to 
evaluate if natural resource dependence impacts financial development differently when 
institutions are of a better quality.  
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The paper is organized as follows, section 2 reviews the literature on natural resource curse 
and growth , in particular the range of hypotheses that are consistent with a link between 
resource dependence and financial development. The dataset used and empirical methodology 
are discussed in Section 3. In section 4, we present the empirical methodology and results of 
the econometric model and interpretation. Section 5 concludes the research. 
We first introduce  the overall structure of MENA’s financial systems and the evolution of the 
mineral resource sector.  
 
1.1 Overview on MENA’s Financial Landscape and The Oil Sector:  
 
It is important to understand the structure of the financial sector in the MENA region and how 
it developed over time compared to other regions. An index constructed by the international 
monetary fund based on an aggregate measure of four variables
5
 to capture the size of the 
financial sector, ease of channeling private funds and the concentration of funds to private 
sector compared to public sector ( Creane, Goyal, Mobarak & Sab ,2004). As shown in Figure 
(1) , MENA had improved the index score from the 1960s through the 1980s, surpassing 
newly industrialized economies (including southeast Asia), Latin America and Sub-Saharan 
Africa. However, financial deepening worsened afterwards due to slow rate of development 
because of political turbulence and other shocks , thus the index fell compared to other 
regions but with exceptions in some countries that have made advancements and reform since 
1960s like Egypt, Tunisia , Morocco and Jordan ( Creane et al., 2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
5  The variables included are : (1) ratio of broad money (M2) to GDP; (2) ratio of the assets of deposit money 
banks to assets of the central bank and deposit money banks; (3) reserve ratio; and (4) ratio of credit to private 
sector by deposit money banks to GDP 
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Figure (1) : Financial Development Index: Regional comparison (1960-1990) 
 
   
Source: Creane et al. (2004) 
  
The performance of countries in the region is not homogenous. Countries in the Gulf 
cooperation council (GCC )were major providers of official and private funds to global 
markets between 1970s and 1980s as they were running a current account surplus. The rest of 
MENA countries were dependent on workers’ / emigrants’ remittances and capital flow to 
restore their fiscal imbalances (Chalk, Jbili, Treichel, & Wilson,1996). The financial sector 
until the 1980s was heavily regulated, dominated by large financial institutions which are 
generally large, while nonbanking financial entities like savings and credit cooperatives, 
mutual funds and insurance companies were almost negligible. Various reforms have been 
initiated over the past decade to address several problems especially the lack of competition, 
lack of financial infrastructure and the limited coverage and depth of credit information. 
However, the government measures are not being taken with the sufficient pace to cope with 
the changing business environment (World Bank, 2011b) which can have consequence on 
long run economic growth especially in the wake of financial liberalization and market 
integration.  
Considering the fact that the region is heavily endowed with natural resources and specially 
oil, the question to ask would be if the capital intensive oil sector has an impact on overall 
growth potential in general and on financial sector reform in particular. The Middle East 
region alone holds approximately 48% of global proved reserves of oil at the end of 2011 and 
thus the oil sector is considered to be the dominant source of revenue and wealth (World 
Bank, 2011a).  Such wealth is accompanied with several political challenges, due to the 
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concentration of rents under the control of government and tendency to observe autocratic 
regimes in the region. 
According to World Bank development and economic prospects report (2006) ,resource rich 
countries have achieved slower progress in financial reform, trade liberalization, 
diversification and improving business climate compared to resource poor ones in the region 
over the last decade. Moreover, The historical event of the Arab embargo in 1973 has 
contributed to the surge in revenues as  world oil prices have quadrupled since then to reach a 
record price again after the 1979 shock due to Iranian revolution and the cut of production. 
Resource rents although volatile, have thus enabled some countries in the region to initiate 
infrastructure, reform projects on the economic front and to raise standards of living due to the 
large financial flow of foreign exchange (Okogu, 2003).  
 
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
  
This section will be divided into two parts , in which part one shall review the different 
theories and empirics on the natural resource curse. Part two follows up the discussion by 
specifically focusing on the links between natural resource dependence/abundance and 
financial development.  
  
2.1 Theory and Empirics of Resource Curse :  
 
Since the late 1980s, sizable literature emerged that challenges the view that natural resources 
are generally seen as a blessing for developing countries. In fact, this view advocates that 
natural resources  are one of the factors that increase the likelihood of  adverse political and 
economic outcomes and hence, the term “resource curse” emerged. The main reasons why 
resource-based models of development  can inhibit long run economic growth are traced to 
the Dutch disease, rent seeking, weak institutions, failures of economic policy and neglect of 
education
6
. 
                                                             
6 An extensive examination of the validity of natural resource paradox and the different explanations is given by 
Caselli and Cunningham (2009), Rosser (2006), Sachs and Warner (1995) and van der Ploeg and Venables 
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Following the seminal and influential studies of Sachs and Warner (1995,2001) who 
examined a large panel of natural resource economies between 1970-1989 found that natural 
resource abundance is negatively correlated with economic growth; revealed when controlling 
for the effect of other economic and policy variables like trade openness and quality of 
institutions. A large volume of subsequent research has thus been inspired to examine the 
direct and indirect channels through which resource rich economies might be subject to this 
curse7.   
The most popular explanation in the literature for the curse is the “Dutch disease effect”. The 
Dutch disease models (Van Wijnbergen, 1984) predict that natural resource revenues cause 
appreciation of real exchange rate as a result of a spending effect on non tradeables, 
speculative capital inflows and higher inflation due to domestic spending of resource-related 
revenues (Auty 1993, 1997 and 2001a , Corden and Neary1982; Corden 1984; Gelb 1988; 
Gylfason 2001a and 2001b; Gylfason, Herbertsson & Zoega, 1999; Humphreys Sachs & 
Stiglitz, 2007; Rodriguez and Sachs 1999; Ross 1999; Sachs and Warner 1995 and 2001) . 
This undermines competitiveness of the manufacturing sector
8
 and consequently impedes 
diversification. Therefore countries become more exposed to macroeconomic volatility and 
shocks. The reallocation of resources from high skill manufacturing sector to low skill 
sectors
9
 can adversely affect economic growth due to reduced ‘learning by doing’ especially if 
specialization in primary product exports is being reinforced for a long period of time . “All in 
all, the extraction of natural resources sets in motion a dynamic that gives primacy to two 
domestic sectors: natural resource and the non- tradeables sector at the expense of the export 
sectors” ( Humprehys et al., 2007: 5). Consequently, this changes the composition of 
production  to one that determines the growth rate of the economy harms welfare
10
 and long 
run productivity.  For mineral economies, Nankani (1979) argues that they perform worse on 
competitive measures , export diversification and inflation compared to non mineral ones. In 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
(2009). The main aim of our research is not the empirical scrutiny of those theories in particular and hence they 
are not discussed in details in the paper.  
7 For an excellent survey, see Frankel (2010)  
8 This is also known by the spending effect ( Humphreys et al.,2007) 
9 This effect is known by resource pull effect (Humphreys et al.,2007) 
10 High levels of inequality is observed in resource rich countries  as a result of income distribution being 
skewed in favor of the natural resource sector that suffers from less equitable distribution of returns (Sachs and 
Warner,2001)  
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addition, they tend to experience more volatility in export earning, high unemployment and  
high external indebtedness.  
The Dutch disease is not the only channel through which growth is affected by the resource 
windfall. Equally important are the incentives that windfalls create for rent seeking along with 
ill-defined property rights and loose legal structures and thus the revenues generated are 
independent of how well the economy is performing which incentivize rent seeking 
opportunities and engaging in unproductive activities (see Baland and Francois 2000; 
Mehlum, Moene & Torvik,2006; Torvik 2002). This has disastrous consequences beyond the 
economic structure of a country, as the competition for rent
11
 can increase the probability of 
civil conflicts and corruption ( Collier and Hoeffler 2005; Leite and Weidmann, 2002). 
Moreover , when the state has full authority on the redistribution of those rents , it maintains a 
kind of social and political control over citizens which can have important implications for 
future institutional development and policy making framework setting ,weakening the state-
societal relations (Auty,1993). Rentier states usually exploit their fiscal independence and are 
geared towards maintaining their power to appoint government jobs, contracts or grants in 
return for political favors and social support from their networks (Auty,1993) rather than 
promoting private investment, economic growth or developing a strong institutional base. This 
paves the way for certain interest groups (mainly international companies) or social groups in 
the resource sector to posses relatively strong bargaining power.Consequently, such entities 
can to challenge the state, should it attempts to undergo reforms that endanger the interests of 
the  oil / mineral led development model. Among the formal models of rent seeking, Tornell 
and Lane (1999,2000) and Torvik, (2002) show that in the presence of multiple interest 
groups , resource windfalls create dynamics known as “the verocity effect” . These result in 
fiscal imbalances in the form of current account deficits and disproportionate fiscal 
redistribution in the context of weak legal and political infrastructure.  
 
However, evidence suggests that not all resource rich countries undergo this similar fate. An 
important  proposition  as to why some resource rich countries have prospered while others 
have fallen behind is due to the interaction between institutions and resources. Countries with 
institutions that promote accountability, control corruption, protect property rights and state 
                                                             
11 Rents are defined as the revenues in excess of production costs and the return on capital 
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competence will tend to positively gain from resource booms since these institutions shape 
policy outcomes. This is exemplified by the successful experience of Norway ( Mehlum et 
al.,2006) as proper institutions increase the cost of non productive activities. Leite and 
Weidman (1999) found that  natural resource abundance tends to worsen corruption especially 
in less developed economies where rule of law and institutions in general are slothful because 
of rent seeking activities. However, some scholars  argue that institutions are more critical for 
point resources
12
 like oil, diamonds, minerals than for diffuse resources as rice and wheat 
which show insignificant correlation with institutional quality and economic growth in the 
1980s and 1990s ( Bulte, Damania & Deacon 2005; Boschini et al. 2007; Isham et al. 2002; 
Sala-I-Martin and Subramanian 2003). The economic and political institutional quality is 
gaining more grounds in explaining the resource curse.  
The legal institution in particular is among the factors that shape financial development in 
resource rich countries. So much that the main functions of the financial sector are better 
executed in the presence of  private property rights protection, contract enforcement and 
effective corporate governance. 
Gylfason (2001a) contributed to this literature by explaining the effect natural resource 
abundance has on human capital; as there is diminished public and private incentive for 
accumulation of human capital due to a high level of non-wage income. This is asserted from 
the empirical evidence of Gylfason et al. (1999) who find an inverse relationship between 
secondary school enrolment and primary sector employment. This contradicts the results of 
Bravo-Ortega, De Gregorio & Paraguay (2005) as they find that higher educational 
attainments can counter act the negative effects of resource abundance. The “crowding out” of 
human capital by resource abundance can therefore undermine growth potential. In addition, 
Gylfason and Zoega (2001) show empirically using a sample of 85 countries for the period 
1965 to 1998 that abundant natural resources crowd out physical capital in the form of lower 
optimal saving and investments (small capital- output ratio) as well as slowing down the 
emergence of a well-developed financial system. This is congruent with Atkinson and 
Hamilton’s (2003) findings of lower saving rates on average in resource abundant countries 
than in resource poor countries.  
                                                             
12 There are called point resources as they are extracted from a narrow geographic or economic base.  
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Therefore, even though the negative relationship between natural resource abundance and 
various economic outcomes is confirmed;  the empirical evidence is not “bulletproof” (Sachs 
and Warner, 2001) as there remains some controversy among scholars. Some strands in the 
literature actually argue that the resource curse does not exist, and that resource abundance 
positively affects economic growth ( Boyce and Emery 2005; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 
2008; Esfahani et al. 2009 ; Davis 1995 and Herb 2005 ). Even in the case of mineral rich 
countries; Alexeev and Conrad (2009) found that large endowments of oil or other minerals 
do not slow down long term economic growth when controlling for several initial conditions 
and regional dummies. Stijns (2005) pointed towards the idea that it does not make much 
difference which natural resource the country is endowed with or the leading sector that 
affects growth , but rather how it produces and the kind of knowledge accumulation process. 
In addition, he found that when natural resources are measured in terms of levels of 
production or reserves rather than  exports, there is no statistical significant effect on growth.   
The origin of the mixed empirical result stems from the several factors. First, the variable used 
as a measure of resource abundance or dependence is different. Sachs and Warner (1995) have 
used the ratio of primary exports to GDP as a measure of resource abundance but in fact this 
measure is for resource dependence instead which is supported by Brunnschweiler and Bulte 
(2008). Very few studies have differentiated between the type of resource endowed (whether 
point resources or not)  and was aggregated into one variable , which would give a misleading 
result of the effect of natural resources on growth as the physical characteristics of the 
resource can make a difference. 
From the econometric point of view; different estimation techniques have been used that 
range from simple cross sectional approach to sophisticated panel data techniques like the 
generalized method of moments ( GMM) . Much criticism has been directed towards the cross 
sectional method as it does not take into account the time dimension of the data and suffers 
from endogeneity. Consequently, the statistical robustness of the effect of natural resources on 
growth is doubtful or ambiguous.  
Davis (1995) has taken a different track and showed that economic growth in particular is not 
the only measure that should be examined when assessing the economic performance of 
resource rich countries, as mineral economies between 1970s and 1990s have outperformed 
non mineral economies on some social and economic measures as average GNP per capita, 
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infant mortality, life expectancy, calorie supply per capita and the human development index. 
This would raise the viable question of whether studies show correlation rather than causation. 
It could instead that the causation runs from development to natural resource dependence in 
the sense that extensive reliance on resource is a result of underdevelopment rather than the 
opposite (Rosser, 2006) 
Taking into account the importance of social and political variables in shaping outcomes of 
natural resource wealth; the focus of current research is thus being directed towards 
investigating what political and social conditions enable some resource abundant countries to 
utilize their natural resources to promote development. This would underpin the prerequisites 
at which resource wealth is associated with good development outcomes, and therefore 
constructive policy recommendations.  
 
2.2 Theoretical Foundation and Empirical Evidence of the link between 
Natural Resources and Financial Development: 
 
From the above, we have discussed that despite ongoing debates in the literature, resource 
dependence is linked to the appearance of a ‘curse’. Particularly so for mineral rich countries 
as MENA. Consequently, more recent strands in the literature, based on modern economic 
theory, provide an intellectual framework for understanding how natural resource 
abundance/dependence can influence the pace of financial development. Beck (2011)  
explained that there are demand and supply side explanations for the effect of natural resource 
abundance on financial development.  On the one hand, regarding the demand side,  as 
discussed earlier , Dutch disease can lead to the expansion of consumer credit as a result of 
more demand for financial services. Another potential and quite opposite effect is the lower 
demand for external finance in resource-based economies, as well as for financial services, 
due to lower savings and investment rates
13
in resource-based economies previously 
highlighted . On the other hand, from the supply side, a resource abundant economy can 
crowd out investment and skills in the financial sector. In addition, the resource curse in the 
institutional setting undermines financial development due to loss of credibility . 
                                                             
13 Resource rents can act as a substitute for private saving and therefore if the financial structure is weak , 
different forms of distortions could arise in the economy such as the inefficiency of investments (Beck,2011) 
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It is therefore critical to understand the channels through which resource abundance can 
influence the pace of financial development. Three key linkages between abundant natural 
resources and financial development have been described in the literature, and on which we 
shall include in our empirical model in later stage of the paper: 
Firstly, as previously described , the over exploitation of natural resources would tend to shift 
factors of production ( i.e labour and capital) away from the manufacturing sector and 
therefore shrinking the manufacturing or traded sector as they lose competitiveness (Van 
Wijnbergen, 1984; Gylfason et al., 1999). However, trade is one of the determinants of 
financial development especially in developing countries ( Baltagi, Demetriades & Law 
,2009). But “the strengthening of promoter relative to opponent industries resulting from 
liberalization is a good predictor of subsequent financial development” (Braun and Raddatz, 
2008) as interest groups have conflicting incentives to support or oppose financial 
development ( Rajan and Zingales,2003). Therefore, resource abundance, which weakens the 
traded sector, may also have a negative impact on the pace of financial development 
Secondly, the accompanied resource rents may increase opportunities for rent-seeking and 
corruption which undermines confidence and credibility in governments policies. These two 
components are important pillars for any financial reform implemented. In developing 
resource countries, when the initial proportion of entrepreneurs to rent seekers is low, a 
resource boom will reduce entrepreneurs. They are the ones who demand external finance and 
hence are promoters of financial development ( Baland and Francois, 2000). In that case, 
financial development is weakened due to lower demand.  
Thirdly, as physical and human capital is crowded out by resource rents, social capital is 
crowded out by the false sense of security and lack of good economic management which 
endangers the level of trust in the economy. Indeed, social capital is crucial for financial 
development as financial contracts are trust based. Therefore, if social capital is reduced by 
resource boom, one can expect the pace of financial development to be affected.  
  
One of the few attempts that try to study the link between natural resource abundance and 
financial development, is Gylfason and Zoega (2001).They used a sample of  85 countries and 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) method, they supported the argument that higher 
dependence on natural resources is correlated with lower degree of financial development. In 
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their model this is captured by the variable ( M2/GDP) which is a common proxy in the 
literature for financial depth. Through the systems of equation, they showed an inverse 
association between natural resources and economic growth through investment in physical 
capital, education and savings.   
The theoretical and empirical politico-economic models developed by Bhattacharyya and 
Hodler (2010) have also been an important departure point for our empirical framework. This 
paper is inspired to test the institutions effects in MENA from their findings. Their model is 
based on a panel data covering 133 countries for the period 1970 to 2005, their findings 
confirm that the quality of political institutions affects the interacting relationship between 
resource revenues and financial development.  Resource rents act as a disincentive for the 
government to initiate reforms of the financial sector or to promote contract enforcement  
resulting in financial underdevelopment. However, when controlling for strong institutions, 
this effect is minimized.  
In a more in depth study by Beck (2011) not only is the performance of the financial system  
examined, but also the development of the stock market in resource rich countries is tested. 
Using cross sectional analysis where data is averaged for the period 2000-2007 and 
controlling for economic development for a panel of countries , he found that countries which 
rely more on natural resource exports have lower levels of private credit. A one standard 
deviation higher natural resource exports implies 10 percentage points lower private credit. 
Besides, other variables for financial development were used to test the sensitivity of results 
such as loan deposit ratio, stock market capitalization to GDP and stock market turnover. 
Beck (2011) pointed out that Banks in resource rich countries are better capitalized and 
profitable but they impose more supply constraints on loans to enterprises rather than to 
households compared to resource poor countries. He also show a clear example of the Dutch 
disease, the crowding out of non resource exports. In this study, the resource curse in financial 
development is mainly channeled through the Dutch disease effect on real exchange rate 
appreciation. This article thus marks an important reference for later work as it is the first 
attempt on this topic with such a broad analysis of the financial sector. Besides, we have 
depended on this analysis for a better understanding of the different financial indicators and 
their significance to address our research question.     
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A different approach focusing on China , Yuxiang and Chen (2011)  used provincial panel 
data over the period 1996-2006 and applied a system GMM estimator. They found that 
mineral resource abundance is an important determinant of financial development relying on 
the our previously explained linkages ( trade openness, rents, social capital and investment).  
In addition, financial development is a statistically significant variable for long run growth 
after controlling for the effect of investment. In a recent study by Kurronen (2012) on 133 
countries after controlling for important determinants of financial development using pooled 
and fixed effect estimator ; it is found that the banking sector tends to be smaller in resource-
dependent countries as well the threshold at which increased dependence would have an 
adverse effect on the financial sector. Moreover, a small financial sector that serves the 
resource sector solely, would undermine growth potential of business ventures for small and 
medium enterprises; hence low economic diversification ( Lin, Sun & Jiang, 2009).   
Barajas and Yousefi (2012) go beyond traditional empirical studies and examine 
heterogeneity in growth performance that could be related to a finance related resource curse 
through three dimension: on income level, on regional level and oil exports. Using a GMM 
dynamic panel methodology for 146 countries over the period 1975-2005, they find that 
positive gains financial deepening on growth exhibits heterogeneity, in which it is smaller in 
oil exporting countries especially in MENA. The region lacks ability to convert back deposits 
to credit to the private sector which is termed by the authors as ‘quality gap’. The contribution 
of this paper which is related to our interest, is that it recognizes the sub-group differences 
within MENA. Their result suggest that non-GCC countries are the ones driving the negative 
and statistically significant interaction coefficient for the whole region; while for GCC 
countries it is insignificant. Hence, the evidence for a finance channel for the resource curse is 
stronger in non-GCC. In addition, within the non-GCC that are oil producers , they tend to do  
relatively well compared to an equally dependent oil country outside the region. 
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2.3 Theoretical Reflections  
 
In this research, we study the effect of natural resources on the financial sector development in 
MENA and the extent  to which institutional quality matters for relationship between financial 
development and natural resources. The theoretical framework for our purpose is the one 
provided by Beck (2011) , who provided the seminal work on our topic. In addition, we make 
use of the work by Barajas & Yousefi  (2012) and Yuxiang & Chen (2011), however with the 
focus on the MENA region, and employ a quite different estimation strategy due to sample 
size constraints. In exploring if there is a resource curse in financial development in MENA , 
this paper builds on theoretical foundation and literature on the determinants of financial 
development relating to natural resources to determine if variables of financial development 
are indeed negatively affected.  
Including other characteristics of the financial sector ( i.e efficiency and stability) and their 
corresponding variables is motivated by the fact that banking depth (size) alone is not a 
sufficient indicator for a well functioning system. The expansion of the financial sector needs 
to be accompanied by financial efficiency and stability to ensure good management of 
resource revenues and efficient channeling to the real economy (Rocha et al.,2011).This 
intermediary function depends critically on the state of the financial system and is one of the 
region’s challenges. Also as clearly explained by Ayadi, Arbak, Ben-Naceur & Pieter (2013) 
and Creane, Goyal,Mobarak & Sab (2004) that financial sector development is a 
multidimensional concept that involves other criteria like competitiveness, supervision, 
financial openness and institutional capacity just to mention a few and not only the standard 
monetary aggregates that matter. Thus, including more  measures of financial development, as 
we do, gives a richer picture of the banking sector in MENA as little is known about bank 
efficiency and stability in the region. In addition, gaining more insights would prioritize 
policy measures of financial reform.    
     
In considering resource dependence , we are guided by Isham et al. (2002) to use mineral and 
oil resource rents rather than other measures ( like food exports as percentage of GDP) as they 
are the ones generally associated with the resource curse. Moreover, we consider a number of 
areas in which the literature has identified as potential links affecting financial development. 
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From the literature review section, some of the indirect effects of  revenue windfall are high 
inflation, large public sector and inefficient investment. High inflation in resource rich 
countries reflects macroeconomic instability which weakens intermediaries’ allocative  and 
lending capacities and tend to have smaller and less liquid equity markets ( Boyd, Levine & 
Smith 2001; Davis, Ossowski & Fedelino 2003). The political economy approach presented 
by Rajan and Zingales (2003) is considered as a framework under which rents would shape 
interest groups and elite incentives to weigh benefits of a better developed financial system 
and more access to credit. Thus we take into account all previous factors, as they represent 
some of  the negative channels of transmission of natural resource dependence on the 
macroeconomy. 
In regards to the second research question, several institutional variables have been used in the 
literature, however, the concept of institutions is a broad one. For financial development, there 
is interaction between the legal system that protects property and enforces law; the economic 
institution that sets rules of the market and allocation of resources; the political system and the 
social institution (Rachdi and Mensi, 2012) which shall be captured by the quality of 
government variable.  
Therefore, our empirical model builds on theory and previous studies using a set of panel 
regressions that seeks to explore the impact of resource wealth on our indicators of financial 
depth, efficiency and stability in the first section. The second section attempts to examine the  
extent to which institutional quality matters for relationship between financial development 
and natural resources in MENA as shall be elaborated later.  
 
3.  Data and Method 
3.1 Data Description and Sources  
 
Based on our research questions outlined above, our data is classified into the three 
components which represent the three main elements in our study. The first component 
describes the variables we use for natural resource dependence and abundance. Secondly, we 
present our measures financial sector development with its different aspects; depth, efficiency 
and stability. Thirdly, we explain the variables that capture the institutions related to financial 
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development in resource rich countries. Data is gathered mainly from the World Bank 
development indicators (WDI) unless otherwise stated.  
 
The time period covered is from 1980 to 2009, as much of the available data on our important 
dependent variables does not exist prior to 1980. To avoid capturing fluctuations of economic 
cycles, and due to irregular data availability over the whole period; the data is filtered into five 
year periods on average, with six sub- periods being 1980- 84, 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99, 
2000-04 and 2005-09. By this manner, we avoid the sample domination stemming from 
countries with more observations. Moreover by focusing on these issues, we also avoid the oil 
price booms and the accompanying fluctuations on the macroeconomic level that took place 
mid 1970s. In addition, the beginning of this period marks major institutional change in the oil 
sector in the region. After 1973, controls were put on exploitation of  international oil 
companies by transferring property rights to the host countries (Okugu,2003). Oil companies 
had to negotiate for royalties or concession to extract oil. This new transformation poses 
challenges for the governments on the economic and political fronts. 
 
 The dataset of the study covers an unbalanced panel of 17countries from the Middle East and 
North Africa region namely; Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan , Kuwait , Libya , 
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey , United Arab Emirates and 
Yemen . Even though there are other countries in the region; they are excluded due to 
insufficient observations for the whole period on several important variables which limits the 
scope of country coverage of our investigation 
 
3.1.1 Natural Resources Variables  
 
We make the distinction between resource abundance and resource dependence measures as 
both terms could be used interchangeably in a wrong way. As explained by Brunnschweiler 
and Bulte(2008), a favorable effect of resource abundance exists for financial deepening, 
however the opposite effect takes place for resource dependence . The term resource 
dependence refers to the degree to which the economy relies on resource rents. Conventional 
measures in the literature include share of rents in government revenues, exports or gross 
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domestic product (GDP). It is a function of  extraction costs and resource price. Resource 
abundance on the other hand,  refers to endowment of subsoil wealth or deposits of minerals, 
oil and gas which are finite. It is dependent on the country’s geology as well as the technology 
to map and identify locations more efficiently.    
There are three alternative indicators that we shall use for resource dependence and one 
measure for resource abundance. Data is from the World Bank adjusted net savings dataset 
and the world development indicators unless otherwise stated. 
 Resource Dependence  
RENT: Natural resource rents, is the log of rents from natural resources to GDP ratio.. This 
measure is widely used in studies to capture the importance of resource revenues mainly from 
oil, natural gas, ores , precious metals and forest rents ( Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010; 
Collier and Hoeffler, 2009; Ross, 2006 ). It is an exogenous indicator as it is unlikely that 
financial development affects resource rents , as the latter depends on other factors like world 
price and the stock of natural resources available ( Kurronen, 2012). Hence, this variable 
would overcome the concern of endogeneity usually present in growth regressions. 
FUELEXPORT: share of fuel exports in total merchandise export. This is a commonly used 
indicator of resource dependence (e.g. Nili and Rastad 2007). According to WDI dataset, this 
variable is comprised of  (i) petroleum, petroleum products and related materials, (ii) coal, 
coke and briquettes; (iii) manufactured and natural gas. The share of fuel in exports will 
measure the extent to which an economy’s competitiveness is dependent on the natural 
resource sector, and mainly on fuel.  
OlLRENT: Oil Rents are calculated as the difference between the value of crude oil 
production at world prices and total costs of production. This is an exogenous variable as oil 
price is determined by the international market and the extracted quantity change in response 
to other economic or political changes.   
Resource Abundance  
OILRES: Crude oil reserves per 1000 individuals, measured in barrels. This is a proxy for oil 
wealth and is a preferred measure than oil reserve per capita to allow for comparability 
between countries of different population sizes. In addition, this variable is an exogenous 
indicator of resource abundance. Data is from International energy statistics 
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3.1.2 Financial Variables  
 
Following previous literature , several indicators for financial development have been used. 
However some may be more important than others depending on the expected  role of the 
financial system in resource rich countries and the specific aspect that we are interested in 
capturing (Denizer et al. 2002). Accordingly  we have chosen the following variables that 
would serve answering the research question with specific focus on financial depth, efficiency 
and stability. Data is gathered from Financial Development and structure Dataset, 2013 by the 
World Bank. All values are in real terms. 
 
 Financial Depth Indicators  :  
 
CRED: private credit to GDP, that is the extent to which commercial banks and other 
financial institutions excluding the central bank channel credit to private sector activities ( 
firms and households) excluding public sector enterprises. The credit could be in the form of 
loans, purchases of non equity securities,  trade credits and other accounts receivable.  It is the 
most commonly used market based measure of depth describing the banking sector size as 
well as banking activity (Beck 2011; Levine et al. 2000; Nili & Rastad 2007). It is directly 
related to the question of interest regarding financial intermediation between savers and 
investors. Higher level of credit to GDP means more financial interaction with the private 
sector and more credit is available for productive projects.  
 
M2: Ratio of money supply (M2) to GDP , also known as broad money or the monetization 
ratio. This indicator comprises the sum of currency outside banks, demand deposits, and the 
time, savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than the central 
government ( IMF). It incorporates the public sector which is found to be usually huge in size 
in resource rich countries. Even though this variable is not a direct measure of capital 
mobilization, it is a proxy for size of the financial market (Levine et al,  2000). A higher M2 
ratio means further expansion in the financial sector relative to the rest of the economy.  
 
LIQLIA: liquid liabilities of the financial system as percentage of GDP , consist of currency 
plus demand and interest bearing liabilities of banks and non banking financial intermediary. 
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It is the broadest measure of the overall size of the formal intermediary sector
14
 which is 
assumed to be positively correlated with more exchange activities (King and Levine, 1993). 
However, this measure does not distinguish between the use of liabilities.  
 
 Financial  Efficiency :  
 
LDEPOSIT: This is the loan-deposit ratio which measures the ratio of total bank claims 
outstanding on domestic nonfinancial sector to total bank deposits. This captures intermediary 
efficiency in the banking sector and its short term viability. A higher ratio indicates less 
liquidity.  
 
Spread: Net interest Spread is the difference between lending rate charged on loans to private 
sector and deposit rate offered by commercial banks. It measures the efficiency at which 
intermediary institutions channel funds from savers to investors and not a direct measure of 
profitability. This variable is available for only the period starting 1998 
 Financial  Stability:  
 
Zscore : it is calculated as the sum of  return on asset and equity to asset ratio , divided by the 
standard deviation of return on asset, and thus a higher value indicates a more stable banking 
system and lower probability of insolvency. Unfortunately, this variable is only available for 
the years 1998-2009.  
It is noteworthy that even though  each of the indicators used has shortcomings which are 
discussed in the literature, we used this range of indicators to provide a richer picture of 
financial development  than would be the case  if we used only one indicator and thus more 
in-depth analysis.  
 
3.1.3 Institutions Variables  
 
In order to address our second research question concerned with testing if the effect of natural 
resource dependence on financial development differs in the presence of higher quality of 
government institutions; we use the quality of government variable ( QOG) of the 
international country risk guide ( ICRG)  as a proxy for capturing the institutional quality. 
                                                             
14 The formal intermediary sector consists of 3 institutions; the central bank, deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions  
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This variable is the mean value of the ICRG variables: corruption, Law and order and 
bureaucracy with a scale between 0 and 1. Values closer to 1 indicate a better governmental 
quality. The constituent component of  corruption is an assessment of corruption within the 
political system which threatens investment. The Law and order sub-component is an 
assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system and the popular observance of 
the law. Bureaucracy quality sub-component evaluates the strength and expertise of the 
bureaucracy to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government 
services ( The QOG standard dataset codebook, 2011). The institutional environment 
determines the quality and range of financial services. As pointed by Creane at al. (2004) 
depending on the judicial system, government bureaucracy/accountability, and political 
institutions; financial institutions would be unwilling to broaden their activities and offer 
loans   
 
We use other control variables that are determinant for financial development as: average 
years of total schooling for people aged 15 and over which is a proxy for the level of human 
capital ( Gylfason, 2001). We use the stock data from  Barro and Lee Educational Attainment 
Dataset. Real trade openness which is the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP , 
inflation of the consumer price Index (2005 = 100)
15
 as a measure of macroeconomic 
volatility ( Boyd et al, 2001) as resource rich countries tend to have higher inflation and it also 
affects financial aggregates ( Sachs & Warner, 2001;  Shan, Morris, & Sun, 2001), foreign 
direct investment as a percentage of GDP and Real GDP per capita measured in PPP with 
constant 2005 US dollars, are from the Penn World Tables version 7.1. The last two variables 
are used to account for the fact that financial development are likely to be more developed in 
higher income countries in the region. Government size measured by the share of government 
spending in GDP proxies fiscal resources under government’s control that could be potentially 
captured by interest groups ( Rosa, 2012). Data is collected from the WDI.       
 
 
 
 
                                                             
15  This is obtained by the logarithmic transformation of  the annual percentage change in CPI plus 1 ( i.e ln (1+ 
% Δ CPI ) for smoothing the series and to dampen the effect of outliers  
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3.2 Stylized Facts and Data Inspection  
This section is a preliminary exploration of our dataset , in which we discuss main highlights 
of the variables in the region as well as point out to some heterogeneous characteristics within 
MENA. This will become apparent in later stage of the analysis.  
Table (1A) in the appendix reports summary statistics ( mean, standard deviation, minimum 
and maximum)  for the major variables used for the full sample of countries in MENA. The 
average natural resource rents is about 22.7% of GDP with a minimum of 0.007% for Israel in 
1995-2000 and a maximum of 61.1% for Libya in 2005-2009. Fuel Exports as a percentage of 
merchandise exports has an average of 50% among countries across time, with a minimum of 
0.004% in Jordan in1990-95 and maximum of 99% in Libya in 1980-1985 showing a high 
degree of dependency on that sector. Regarding financial development indicators, mean 
private creditor by financial institutions is about 40% with the lowest recorded is 4% for 
Algeria in 1995-2000 and highest for Israel in 2005-2009 with 90.3%.  
From this quick overview of the data, we recognize the degree of heterogeneity within MENA 
and thus explore the two subgroups within MENA; countries in the Gulf cooperation council ( 
GCC) and Arab Mediterranean Countries ( hereafter AM ). The former group includes six 
countries : Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates with the 
summary statistics in table ( 2A) and the later group includes the rest of the sample, with the 
statistics in table (3A). Moreover, we would suspect that GCC countries to exhibit quite 
different characteristics from the rest of the region for two reasons for reasons: 1) they are 
significant oil and mineral exporters due to their reserves and  2) They are classified by the 
World Bank as high income countries , while the rest of MENA is considered to be a lower 
middle income. The disparity of income level can be an important factor in dealing with 
resource wealth.   
As postulated, the GCC countries possess quite different characteristics than the Arab 
Mediterranean countries; the mean natural resource rent is about 38.2% of GDP in GCC 
compared to just 13.7% for AM, fuel exports are 68.2% of merchandise exports compared to 
39.9% in AM. Large endowment of oil and minerals is reflected in the crude oil reserves in 
GCC about five times higher than AM. For financial sector indicators, we can see that, GCC 
are performing poorly compared to the other group except on banks private credit. Private 
credit amounts to 50% percent of GDP in the GCC average, reflecting higher per capita 
 
 
28 
 
incomes and less domestic financing of government deficit. The Arab Mediterranean average 
is lower, at 36 percent of GDP, reflecting lower incomes and a larger volume of public sector 
financing.  The average of loan to deposit ratio in GCC is relatively higher compared to non 
GCC ( 47.5% versus 44.5%) reflecting credit growth through external borrowing.   
On the institutional aspect, there is no large difference in the quality of government. The GCC 
enjoys a higher level of GDP per capita on average compared to AM , which could be linked 
with their higher natural resource rents, and especially from oil.  
It is worth noting the graphical representation of the correlation relationships of Table (1A) in 
the Appendix. The panels in figure (3A) to figure (5A) show the negative correlation between 
natural resource variables and our chosen measures of financial development except the panel 
in figure  3 which shows positive association between oil reserves per 1000 and private credit.  
This brief description of the data highlights some differences in the macroeconomic 
environment between GCC and AM countries. In order to provide more reliable indications of 
natural resource effects, we try to address the heterogeneity in the data estimating the model 
including dummy for GCC countries and  two interaction terms, one with the rents and the 
other with quality of government variable. The estimation results for this sub-group is in the 
last section.    
 
3.3 Financial Development and Natural Resources: Panel Estimation 
Procedure 
3.3.1 Motivation 
 
Some of the studies concerned with the growth - financial development relationship have 
resorted to cross sectional estimation techniques ( see Beck,2011). However, we shall depend 
in this paper on estimation using panel data to overcome some shortcomings of the cross 
section data. The panel data takes into account how natural resource dependence/abundance 
may have an effect on a country’s financial development over time. In addition, adding time-
series dimension of the data enhances the variability of the data and adds more degrees of 
freedom. Previous research that depended on cross section data does not capture countries’ 
unobserved time invariant beside ignoring heterogeneity of the sample. The cross section 
specification explicitly assumes identical production function and technology level across 
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countries. Thus a  cross section regression suffers from omitted variable bias. The panel data 
set allows us to take into account the specific features of each country in the sample (such as 
cultural or political factors)  that are not included in the analysis but may be correlated with 
the independent variable. This otherwise creates a problem of omitted variables and result in 
inconsistent estimators. 
 
 
3.3.2 Methodology  
 
As discussed in previous sections, existing studies provide the theoretical motivation for our 
research. Despite differences in mechanism that each empirical work has relied on , the 
sample size, time period and econometric technique employed; there is general consensus that 
natural resource dependence has an adverse effect on financial sector development in mineral 
and oil rich countries while effect of abundance is not as severe. A test of this prediction for 
MENA can be accomplished using the basic  multivariate empirical framework in the form:  
           
                                                 (1) 
 
Such that     are the dependent variables of the financial development indicators for which 
we shall test successively,   is the sub index for country such that  = 1, 2, ….17 ,   is sub-
index for time period where   = 1, 2,...…6 as we use period averages.    stands for the 
natural resource variables that we test their effect alternatively on the financial sector 
indicators. The parameter estimate    reflects the marginal effect that country-specific natural 
resource variable has on country-specific aspect of financial development depending on the 
variable used.   is a vector of control variables that represent the channels of transmission and 
are critical determinants to financial development as per capita GDP , schooling , investment, 
government size, inflation and trade openness,     is the error term and is independent and 
identically distributed over   and   . All variables are in logarithmic form for smoothing the 
series and for interpreting coefficients as elasticities.  
To address our research question, our main interest is in the magnitude, sign and significance 
of the coefficient on the different natural resource variables. Two methods have been used to 
present econometric estimation for this coefficient. First, a pooled OLS regression is 
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estimated using standard OLS method on equation (1) as it is the simplest approach and is a 
starting point for our analysis . The pooled OLS is considered as a restrictive model because it 
implicitly assumes that the coefficients and the intercept are the same for all countries
16
. 
Equation (1) is estimated by fitting a linear regression to the full dataset, ignoring information 
about how observations are grouped into units. 
Estimating equation (1) can result in biased and inconsistent estimators due to presence of 
unobserved heterogeneities, possible endogeneity and measurement error not accounted for in 
the pooled OLS ( Wooldridge, 2002). Hence, a solution to deal with this issue , is to remove 
the unobserved  fixed effect in the error term using the fixed effect transformation (FE), which 
is our second estimation strategy. The baseline fixed effect model is in the form:  
 
                                                       (2) 
 
The composite error term         includes an unobserved country fixed effect    and a time-
varying component     . The unobserved time invariant individual effects would be captured 
indirectly by equation (2). The variant of this equation from equation(1) is the individual term 
effect     which accomodates heterogeneity as it varies across countries but not over time.  
By taking the average of equation (2) over time for each country, we get:  
 
                                                    +                                                               (3) 
 
Subtracting this mean from equation (2) yields the within model:   
                    
                       ) =                           +                 ) + (           )           (4) 
 
The within estimator provides a consistent estimate of the fixed effect model as it performs 
OLS on the mean differenced data using the variation over time as derived in equation (4). 
The individual effects might capture properties of the political and economic systems that we 
have not included as regressors in our analysis but could be highly correlated to some of our  
                                                             
16 Note the absence of subscript   for the intercept , denoting that it is the intercept does not vary among 
countries  
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important variables like GDP per capita, openness and investment. The latter method is an 
improvement over pooled OLS:  it eliminates country specific effects that could have an effect 
on the differences in the level of financial development between countries and thus decreased 
bias. Such approach is important in the context of our research as we highlighted in our 
stylized facts section. GCC are expected to show different effects due to the high endowment 
of oil and minerals as well as their dependency compared to the other group of countries.The 
magnitude of the effect of natural resources on financial development could be different 
resting on the level of resource endowment and the extent of dependence.  
Because of the time series dimension of the data, we conduct a wooldridge (2002) test for 
serial correlation between the the individual effects and the regressors over time. Baltagi 
(2001) states that if correlation exists, then it will bias the standard errors and cause the 
estimators to be less efficient, thus it must be corrected or controlled for. Since the null 
hypothesis of no correlation for all model specification is not rejected, we correct it as well as 
control for heteroskedasticity using robust cluster standard error to for valid statistical 
inference following ( Arellano,1987) 
It should be noted that our methodology is not without drawbacks. Empirical research that 
relies on regional experience is often constrained by the quality and quantity of data available 
for the restricted number of countries in the sample as is the case in our research
17
. A small 
sample size minimizes the prospects for reliable generalization of a causal relationship 
between variables, and thus parameter estimates are imprecise. One source of imprecision is 
when some of the explanatory variables are either measured at infrequent intervals, or the 
variable show small year to year variation relative to changes in the dependent variable. The 
latter case is apparent in our dataset for three of our regressors: Schooling, oil reserves and 
quality of government variable. If the correlation between these variables and the individual 
effects is high, this can distort the effect of the independent variables and thus bias the 
estimates (Durlauf et al., 2005).  
Another potential source of imprecision is the measurement error in variables which is 
compounded by the within groups transformation to eliminate the individual effects ( 
Swaffield,2001). A particular concern is raised for the natural resource abundance variable; oil 
                                                             
17 We had to exclude two countries from the initial analysis : Iraq and Lebanon, due to insufficient number of 
observations.   
 
 
32 
 
reserves per 1000 is an estimated volume of oil in the ground. Despite new technology, 
advanced geologic and engineering techniques to measure the size and recoverability of the 
resource, uncertainties still remain on how accurate this variable is. In addition, the data 
disclosed by government could be adjusted for economic or political reasons.  
The use of fixed effect estimation is less biased than the pooled OLS regression as we 
eliminate the unobserved time invariant characteristics. The reduction in bias typically comes 
at the expense of higher standard errors (Wooldridge,2001). Moreover, sample size limited 
our ability to apply a more sophisticated method that would address problem of endogeneity 
and time changing omitted variables simultaneously such as the GMM technique. Thus we 
resort to use within country variation of the fixed effect model. 
 
4. Results and Discussion :  
This section consists of two section, such that the first one presents the results of the pooled 
OLS regression followed by brief discussion. The second section is the fixed effect model 
estimation results.  
 
4.1. Pooled OLS Regressions :  
The effect of resource dependence on the three indicators of financial depth in MENA is 
shown in table (1.1). Each of the columns (a - c) uses a different measure of resource 
dependence and the only measure of resource abundance (Oil Reserves ) is in column (d). It 
should be noted that these coefficients are based on averages of countries and provide a 
preliminary link between natural resources and financial development for the unbalanced 
panel. 
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Table 1.1: Pooled OLS Estimates: Financial Depth 
 
Natural resource variables in general have a negative effect on measures of financial depth , 
however, not always statistically significant. Holding all factors constant, an increase of one 
percent in natural resource rents of GDP would lower banks credit to the private sector by 
0.079% while oil rents in specific would affect it by -0.052% with significance level of 10% 
and 5% respectively. Although fuel exports have a negative effect on private credit expansion, 
it is statistically insignificant. Resource rents and fuel exports have a weaker effect on M2 and 
Liquid liability than on private credit. Oil rents are highly statistically significant for all three 
measures , with stronger impact on private credit. This results is in line with findings of 
previous studies that find adverse impact of mineral and oil rent on financial deepening ( Beck 
2011; Kurronen 2012).   
Resource abundance, proxied by oil reserves per 1000 has a very small negative effect. An 
increase in oil reserves by 1% , would decrease the monetization ratio by 0.018% with a 
significance level of 10%. In agreement with Barajas et al. (2012), large endowment in oil as 
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (3a) (3b) (3c) (3d)
Inflation -0.215*** -0.221** -0.180** -0.200** -0.00349 -0.00723 0.0193 0.0106 -0.0738* -0.0806** -0.0525 -0.0650*
(0.0808) (0.0846) (0.0819) (0.0829) (0.0344) (0.0355) (0.0327) (0.0346) (0.0377) (0.0379) (0.0367) (0.0379)
Real GDP 0.372*** 0.346*** 0.399*** 0.399*** -0.0284 -0.0476 -0.00720 -0.00826 -0.0372 -0.0600 -0.0173 -0.0222
(0.114) (0.120) (0.115) (0.119) (0.0474) (0.0488) (0.0452) (0.0487) (0.0517) (0.0521) (0.0500) (0.0529)
Gov Exp 1.564** 1.680** 1.692** 2.122*** 0.837*** 0.895*** 0.783*** 1.105*** 1.050*** 1.062*** 1.016*** 1.329***
(0.676) (0.681) (0.664) (0.637) (0.300) (0.294) (0.279) (0.279) (0.323) (0.309) (0.305) (0.296)
Investment 0.344* 0.327* 0.318* 0.386** -0.235*** -0.267*** -0.260*** -0.222*** -0.116 -0.173** -0.135* -0.0926
(0.177) (0.196) (0.181) (0.182) (0.0713) (0.0771) (0.0686) (0.0722) (0.0793) (0.0838) (0.0775) (0.0796)
Openess 0.136 0.00772 0.196 0.0467 0.615*** 0.559*** 0.681*** 0.579*** 0.494*** 0.474*** 0.569*** 0.481***
(0.224) (0.219) (0.228) (0.218) (0.0967) (0.0937) (0.0924) (0.0933) (0.106) (0.0993) (0.103) (0.101)
Schooling 0.0614 0.200 0.0397 0.200 0.0782 0.164 0.0155 0.137 0.0631 0.139 -0.00440 0.106
(0.276) (0.265) (0.269) (0.259) (0.110) (0.102) (0.101) (0.0995) (0.119) (0.106) (0.110) (0.107)
Rents -0.0787* -0.0450** -0.0301
(0.0449) (0.0202) (0.0217)
Fuel Exports -0.0502 -0.0276* -0.0178
(0.0344) (0.0149) (0.0157)
Oil Rents -0.0521** -0.0415*** -0.0318***
(0.0259) (0.0109) (0.0120)
Oil Reserves -0.0201 -0.0180* -0.00818
(0.0214) (0.00950) (0.0101)
Constant -8.296** -8.235** -9.432*** -10.98*** -1.473 -1.378 -1.602 -2.732* -2.163 -1.877 -2.400 -3.628**
(3.549) (3.800) (3.501) (3.545) (1.565) (1.626) (1.464) (1.540) (1.680) (1.706) (1.591) (1.634)
Observations 79 75 78 78 91 87 90 90 86 82 85 85
Adj. R-squared 0.4096 0.3959 0.4194 0.3936 0.5215 0.5233 0.5742 0.5203 0.4967 0.5173 0.5406 0.5029
Standard errors in parentheses , *** Statistically significant at 1% , ** statistically significant at 5%, * statistically significant at 10 %
Private Credit 
Explanatory Variables 
M2 Liquid Liability
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well as dependence on its rents would lead to expected shrinking in the size of the financial 
sector in MENA relative to the rest of the economy; yet our result is much lower..  
Regarding the other determinants of financial sector depth, they are mostly as expected and in 
line with previous studies. Inflation generally has the hypothesized negative sign on all 
dependent variables with very negligible and statistically insignificant effect on M2. Financial 
institutions would lend less and allocate capital less effectively to the private sector, an 
expected drop between 0.18% and 0.22 percent in private credit.  
Government dependence on resource rents, which is a safe asset and a major source of  
spending does not crowd out private credit; as intermediary institutions take more risk and 
increase their lending to the private sector as shown in columns (1a-1d) . This is contrary with 
previous finding of Emran and Farazi (2009) who find that a $1.00 more borrowing by 
government reduces private credit by about $1.40 on a panel of 60 developing countries.  
Investment is positive and statistically significant for private credit but negative for the other 
variables. More investments spur more demand for external finance from intermediaries 
which would enhance the activity of the financial sector between the range 0.318% and 
0.386% but at the same time shrinking its size. We thus infer from this that financial activity 
is most likely concentrated among few institutions that are large in size. Trade openness has a 
statistical significance and large economic impact on M2 and liquid liability but  statistically 
insignificant and smaller one on private credit expansion. This result is in accordance with 
previous studies in the more open economies for trade and capital flows are more financially 
developed than closed ones ( see  Rajan and Zingales , 2003; Baltagi et al. , 2009). 
Consequently, higher human capital is a favorable determinant for a deeper financial sector , 
yet it loses significance for all the variables.  
Overall, we see from this analysis that resource dependence has a stronger impact of financial 
depth compared to resource abundance. However, the magnitude and significance of the 
coefficient varies across variables. Oil rents are consistently significant, while fuel exports are 
insignificant except for M2. Private credit and M2 are the most affected by resource wealth 
compare to liquid liability.      
    
Exploring the impact of natural resource dependence and abundance on the other two 
characteristics of the financial sector (efficiency and stability) would give a more elaborate 
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picture. We show the results of the regressions in Table (1.2) where both variables of Loan – 
deposit ratio and spread are measures of intermediary efficiency, while Z-score is a measure 
of stability.  
Table 1.2 : Pooled OLS Estimate: Financial efficiency and Stability 
 
 
Regarding intermediary efficiency, resource dependence (fuel exports , oil rents and rents in 
column 1a, 1b and 1d respectively) has a negative and statistically significant effect on loan-
deposit ratio. The biggest impact from resource rents is that a 1% increase in rents share of 
GDP would decrease loan-deposit ratio by 0.066% with significance level 5%. A very high 
ratio is interpreted as a liquidity risk for banks to meet depositors’ claims,  while a low ratio 
indicates excess liquidity and a stagnant financial activity which eventually leads to low 
profits. Again, resource rents is the major driving variable among resource dependence 
variables with considerably large and negative effect on net interest spread; a 1% increase in 
rents would lower the spread by 0.120%. In addition, resource abundance has a similar but a 
weaker effect on efficiency. Concerning financial sector stability, from column ( 3a - 3d) , the 
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (3a) (3b) (3c) (3d)
Inflation -0.0375 0.0135 -0.00411 -0.0299 0.386*** 0.400*** 0.421*** 0.378*** -0.0301 -0.00580 -0.00551 -0.0364
(0.0569) (0.0535) (0.0536) (0.0553) (0.119) (0.119) (0.115) (0.115) (0.176) (0.167) (0.173) (0.174)
Real GDP -0.0204 0.0519 0.0686 0.0108 -0.165 -0.159 -0.115 -0.170 0.109 0.0893 0.152 0.0628
(0.0839) (0.0779) (0.0801) (0.0810) (0.160) (0.158) (0.155) (0.154) (0.222) (0.211) (0.227) (0.218)
Gov Exp 0.722 0.599 0.855** 0.640 -0.173 -0.254 -0.604 -0.742 0.0735 -1.080 -0.224 -0.503
(0.453) (0.434) (0.413) (0.463) (0.943) (0.939) (0.871) (0.945) (1.395) (1.326) (1.271) (1.395)
Investment -0.245* -0.252** -0.218* -0.209* 0.0118 -0.0300 -0.163 -0.0683 0.338 -0.0318 0.108 0.140
(0.128) (0.115) (0.115) (0.118) (0.239) (0.240) (0.239) (0.229) (0.432) (0.398) (0.408) (0.399)
Openess 0.539*** 0.753*** 0.596*** 0.644*** 0.235 0.383 0.325 0.486 0.961* 1.335** 0.944* 1.300**
(0.144) (0.146) (0.139) (0.150) (0.374) (0.387) (0.358) (0.379) (0.570) (0.555) (0.544) (0.608)
Schooling 0.327* 0.113 0.222 0.206 0.872** 0.836** 0.783** 0.655* -0.454 -0.742 -0.444 -0.566
(0.166) (0.167) (0.158) (0.179) (0.354) (0.361) (0.332) (0.367) (0.605) (0.558) (0.549) (0.594)
Fuel Exports -0.0408* -0.0435 -0.0729
(0.0227) (0.0498) (0.0946)
Oil Rents -0.0571*** -0.0354 -0.113**
(0.0166) (0.0367) (0.0543)
Oil Reserves -0.0421*** -0.0714** -0.0667
(0.0137) (0.0331) (0.0543)
Rents -0.0659** -0.120* -0.125
(0.0301) (0.0649) (0.102)
Constant -1.355 -2.124 -2.497 -1.614 0.563 0.314 3.183 2.886 -2.772 2.567 -0.326 -0.307
(2.558) (2.276) (2.298) (2.427) (5.417) (5.030) (4.982) (5.125) (7.792) (7.142) (7.432) (7.432)
Observations 73 76 76 77 63 64 64 64 46 47 47 47
Adj. R-squared 0.4222 0.491 0.476 0.4281 0.23 0.2333 0.2802 0.347 0.0405 0.1115 0.0501 0.0503
Explanatory Variables 
Loan- Deposit Ratio  Spread Z-Score 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** Statistically Significant at 1%, ** Statistically significant at 5%, * Statistically significant at 10%
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only significant variable is oil rents as shown in column (3b), in which more oil rents as share 
of GDP is likely to affect bank soundness and solvency position. The number of observations 
for this variable is quite small as it is available only since 1998.Hence, there is a lower 
goodness of fit of the model compared to other model specifications.  
From the above, we can conclude that in accordance with the literature ; we find that oil rich 
countries and which are also dependent on rents in MENA have a less developed financial 
sector. This is measured with regards to the size of its activity and efficiency in intermediating 
credit from savers to investors and its stability. Banks stability are to a lesser extent linked to 
resource dependnce due to a weak effect. 
 
4.2 Fixed Effect Regressions :  
 
To eliminate the unobserved heterogeneity bias as explained in detail earlier, we run an OLS 
on the within model of equation (4). Tables (2.1) and (2.2) show the estimation results of the 
fixed effect model in the same sequence of the previous sub-section. Regarding financial 
depth which is in table (2.1), our variables of interest for resource dependence in columns (a, 
b, c ) have the most statistical significant impact on private credit compared to M2 and liquid 
liability. Both natural resource rents and oil rents as a percentage of GDP are the leading 
variables among natural resource indicators with higher values of coefficients as well as their 
standard errors compared to the pooled OLS estimates. So much so that an increase of one 
percent in share of rents is associated with a decrease in private credit, M2 by 0.144% and 
0.076%  respectively. The effect of oil rents is more pronounced on three indicators, reflected 
in the drop by 0.23%, 0.077% and 0.078% in private credit, M2 and liquid liability 
respectively for an increase in oil rents share of GDP by 1%.    
Fuel exports are not statistically significant on any of the financial depth variables , and hence 
it can be argued that there is a weak link between financial development and the structure of 
the export concentration in the resource sector. This finding is contrary to Kurronen (2012) 
,where the share of fuel exports exceeds 5.8% as the threshold, private credit is affected by -
0.06% for every percentage change in fuel exports, while the effect on M2 is negligible.   
Resource abundance is negatively and highly statistically significant for private credit and 
M2, such that more endowment in oil reserves is associated with lower level of credit to 
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private sector and smaller size of the financial sector. This can be interpreted as the oil wealth 
(although still in the ground) is a disincentive to engage in the non resource sector due to the 
guaranteed source of income ( in the form of rents) which creates low demand for external 
finance from commercial banks. Both the size and activity of the financial sector is adversely 
affected by natural resource dependence and abundance. Our estimate is close to the results 
found in Chinese provinces by Yuxiang and Chen (2011). Control variables are still consistent 
with expectation in terms of sign but not necessarily in terms of significance, for instance real 
GDP per capita and investment lost their significance while trade openness and education 
gained more importance. Trade openness creates opportunities to be engaged in the non 
resource sector and thus encourages entrepreneurship which result in the expansion of the size 
of the financial sector and more credit to the private sector. A well educated population seems 
to prefer to hold their wealth in the form of financial assets rather than physical assets due to 
more access to information. More savings are likely to stimulate the credit creation ability of 
banks and more transactions.  
The effect of resource dependence and abundance on the other characteristics of financial 
sector efficiency and stability is shown in Table (2.2) with the estimation results. Natural 
resource dependence variables are more negatively significant for loan-deposit ratio and 
spread but insignificant for Z-score. The biggest impact is from natural resource rents and oil 
rents on banks’ spread rate as shown in columns ( 2a, 2c), as a 1% increase in rents share in 
GDP is correlated with a drop in banks’ spread by -0.716%  with significance level of 1%.  
Countries with higher resource rents especially oil rents would tend to have financial 
institutions whose net interest spread  are low, and thus less efficient in intermediating funds 
between savers and investors. Again, fuel exports are insignificant for all the variables of 
efficiency and stability confirming the weak link between competitiveness of the trade sector 
and financial sector efficiency and stability.   
Contrary to the result of the pooled OLS regression, resource abundance ( i.e oil reserves per 
1000) have a negligible effect on all financial variables in this model specification, which 
points to a weak channel between resource endowment and banks efficiency and stability.  
Interestingly, stability of the intermediary sector proxied by Z-score in columns (3a-3d) is not 
affected by neither natural resource dependence nor abundance, and very weakly affected by 
the other variables in the  model. This can be explained by government banking regulations 
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and supervision closely linked to stability and the effective reform approach recommended by 
IMF which was followed by some countries in the 1990s to build market institutions , 
improve investment climate and develop the financial sector to improve economic efficiency 
and tackle youth unemployment, which is one of the important challenges of the region. 
Besides, the soundness and stability of the financial system is important to face any economic 
downturn associated with a financial bottleneck or crisis.  
Turning to the effect of other macroeconomic variables, inflation has an adverse effect on 
loan- deposit ratio which is significant at 1% , this is in accordance with previous literature      
(e.g. see Denize et al, 2000). The effect of fluctuations in the business-cycle accompanied by 
unanticipated inflation would increase asymmetry of information and change pricing of loans 
and deposits. The slow adjustment of monetary aggregates and response of banking sector to 
adjust interest rates creates a possibility for costs to exceed bank revenues, hence unfavorable 
impact on banks efficiency and profitability ( Ben Naceur and Omran, 2008).  Inflation shocks 
seem to be passed through the deposit rates and jeopardizing solvency, as shown in columns 
(1a-1d) and (3a-3d) with a high significance level. Real output on the other hand, does not 
appear to influence banks loan-deposit ratio, but has very high and significant impact on bank 
efficiency, reflected in a decrease in spread by 2.576% as real output increases by one percent. 
Government size has no effect on any of our efficiency and stability measures.    
To summarize , using the Fixed Effect model, the results show that resource dependence 
variables has a dampening effect on financial depth except fuel exports which are 
insignificant. Oil rents in particular, are highly significant for all three depth measures , with 
stronger impact on private credit. Resource abundance is thus associated with lower level of 
credit to private sector and smaller size of the financial sector.  
Regarding efficiency and stability, natural resource rents and oil rents are more negatively 
significant for loan-deposit ratio and spread but insignificant for Z-score. While fuel exports 
do not seem to have any effect on any of the dependent variables.  
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Table ( 2.1) : Fixed Effect Estimates : Financial Depth   
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (3a) (3b) (3c) (3d)
Inflation -0.1064** -0.0735* -0.1523** -0.1292** -0.0300 -0.0245 -0.00683 -0.0260 -0.0765** -0.0641* -0.0491 -0.0719**
(0.0502) (0.036) (0.0655) (0.0495) (0.0245) (0.0224) (0.0294) (0.0266) (0.0329) (0.0314) (0.0342) (0.0328)
Real GDP 1.094 1.099 1.230 1.235 0.0481 0.0358 0.116 0.146 0.156 0.192 0.226 0.260
(0.707) (0.679) (0.712) (0.776) (0.238) (0.225) (0.235) (0.247) (0.292) (0.287) (0.269) (0.280)
Gov Exp 0.0158 0.219 0.0501 0.162 0.839*** 0.851*** 0.804*** 0.921*** 0.553** 0.569** 0.520 0.677**
(0.774) (0.648) (0.772) (0.837) (0.248) (0.258) (0.258) (0.250) (0.257) (0.261) (0.306) (0.253)
Investment 0.402 0.323 0.107 0.336 0.0430 0.0266 0.0282 0.0269 -0.0665 -0.114 -0.0832 -0.0919
(0.260) (0.197) (0.243) (0.274) (0.0974) (0.0791) (0.0977) (0.102) (0.130) (0.118) (0.126) (0.132)
Openess 0.8354** 0.448 0.766** 0.466 0.327** 0.303** 0.373*** 0.363** 0.396** 0.382** 0.447*** 0.430***
(0.375) (0.403) (0.381) (0.403) (0.132) (0.131) (0.110) (0.126) (0.138) (0.142) (0.112) (0.129)
school 0.621** 0.523** 0.732** 0.744** 0.186 0.287 0.434** 0.377* 0.389 0.0433 0.172 0.064
(0.251) (0.235) (0.272) (0.23) (0.219) (0.234) (0.195) (0.213) (0.245) (0.275) (0.205) (0.220)
Rents -0.144** -0.076** -0.0243
(0.0677) (0.0348) (0.0323)
Fuel Exp 0.0145 -0.0127 -0.0134
(0.0582) (0.0168) (0.0175)
Oil Rents -0.231*** -0.0774* -0.0725*
(0.0878) (0.0438) (0.0410)
Oil Reserves -0.1995*** -0.056** -0.0782
(0.0500) (0.0265) (0.0338)
Constant -5.924 -5.122 -6.644 -7.547 -2.019 -1.977 -2.434 -3.463 -1.188 -1.557 -1.649 -3.219
(7.277) (7.472) (7.536) (8.555) (2.499) (2.408) (2.602) (2.745) (2.522) (2.540) (2.562) (2.801)
Observations 79 75 78 78 91 87 90 90 86 82 85 85
R-squared 0.179 0.189 0.242 0.207 0.343 0.383 0.417 0.391 0.345 0.381 0.429 0.404
Number of Countries 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Explanatory Variable 
Private Credit M2 Liquid Liquidity
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** Statistically significant at 1% , ** Statistically significant at 5%, * Statistically significant at 10%
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Table ( 2.2) : Fixed Effect Estimates:  Financial Efficiency and Stability  
 
 
 
 
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (3a) (3b) (3c) (3d)
Inflation -0.0855*** -0.0871*** -0.0667*** -0.0712*** 0.407 0.406 0.339* 0.389 -0.538** -0.549** -0.593** -0.122
(0.0191) (0.0175) (0.0197) (0.0184) (0.235) (0.242) (0.168) (0.225) (0.254) (0.258) (0.246) (0.259)
Real GDP 0.0347 -0.0237 0.189 0.198 -2.576** -2.590** -2.317** -2.539** 0.741 -0.298 0.324 0.645
(0.296) (0.258) (0.275) (0.284) (1.052) (0.974) (1.034) (1.000) (1.340) (0.768) (1.182) (0.910)
Gov Exp 0.284 0.273 0.332 0.381 0.412 0.432 0.741 0.368 0.257 0.556 -0.129 0.288
(0.295) (0.314) (0.315) (0.294) (1.013) (1.038) (1.078) (0.992) (0.804) (0.807) (0.688) (0.801)
Investment 0.221** 0.197** 0.215** 0.069 0.471 0.496 0.424 0.519 0.340 0.909 0.708 0.426
(0.0978) (0.0872) (0.101) (0.105) (0.297) (0.309) (0.338) (0.335) (0.516) (0.565) (0.709) (0.536)
openess 0.503*** 0.455*** 0.539*** 0.533*** 0.106 0.142 0.101 0.116 0.719 0.763 1.112 0.591
(0.125) (0.110) (0.124) (0.124) (0.967) (0.831) (0.883) (0.847) (1.048) (0.912) (1.138) (0.819)
school 0.452* 0.522* 0.324 0.336 3.801** 3.863** 3.814** 3.871** 0.241 0.515 0.907 0.231
(0.242) (0.259) (0.214) (0.227) (1.402) (1.410) (1.391) (1.441) (0.722) (0.630) (0.832) (0.603)
Rents -0.088*** -0.716*** -0.0573
(0.0198) (0.144) (0.149)
Fuel Exp -0.00267 -0.0298 0.167
(0.0109) (0.0633) (0.140)
Oil Rents -0.042* -0.528* -0.672
(0.0232) (0.294) (0.632)
Oil Reserves -0.0157 -0.212 -0.100
(0.0405) (0.146) (0.243)
Constant -0.752 -0.0850 -2.200 -2.842 14.67* 14.71* 10.81* 16.16* -9.588 -4.384 -7.554 -7.253
(2.772) (2.612) (2.786) (2.924) (8.257) (7.302) (5.651) (8.446) (12.82) (7.246) (10.46) (9.731)
Observations 77 73 76 76 64 63 64 64 47 46 47 47
R-squared 0.569 0.609 0.593 0.594 0.393 0.393 0.410 0.406 0.159 0.199 0.213 0.158
Number of Countries 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 16 16 16 16
Explanantory variable
Loan Deposit Ratio Spread Z-score 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** Statistically significant at 1%, ** Statistically significant at 5%, * Statistically significant at 10%
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4.3 Natural Resources and Institutions :  Do They Matter  ?  
Economic and political institutions shape the incentives of key economic actors ( i.e private 
sector and multinational enterprises). In particular, they influence investments in physical and 
human capital, the organization of production and efficiency of allocation of resources. 
Institutions have been emphasized in the literature as the main cause of differences in economic 
development and growth ( Acemoglu, 2005), as well as depth of financial markets, which are 
more developed in some countries than in others . A large body of research
18
 has shown that 
institutional environment has a crucial impact on the performance of the financial sector. An 
extension to this consensus is on the  importance of the interactions between resource 
endowments/dependence and institutional quality in shaping economic and political outcomes 
(Barma et al. 2010). We take the analysis a step further to examine the extent to which 
institutional quality matters for the relationship between resource dependence and financial 
development in MENA. Thus we add to our model in equation (4) an interaction term      
      where      stands for quality of government institutional variable (QOG ) and NR is our 
resource rents variable, following Bhattacharyya and Roland (2010). The interaction term allows 
the marginal effect of natural resources, NR ( resource rents)
19
 on financial development to vary 
as a function of institutional quality. The total effect of better institutional environment is thus 
calculated by examining the partial derivative of financial development with respect to 
institutional quality.  
 
To the extent that higher quality of government improving the  functioning of  the financial 
sector it is expected to weaken the link between resource rent and financial development. This 
hypothesis is examined by the magnitude of the interaction term on financial development 
variables. Based on the evidence of the previous section, we narrow the analysis of the financial 
sector to only depth and efficiency , as it was found out that banks stability are unaffected by 
neither natural resource dependence or abundance. Therefore, we drop banks stability from the 
                                                             
18 For example, see Rachdi & Mensi (2012), Tressel & Detriagiache (2008) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) 
 
19 We decided to focus on just natural resource rents to include in this model specification due to the theoretical 
and empirical foundation between rents in specific and institutions. In addition, the other variables of natural 
resources show perfect multicollinearity with the interaction terms and are insignificant and thus is dropped from 
the model for better interpretation of the output.  
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analysis presented below. The next section is divided into two parts depending on grouping of 
the sample; first we use the whole sample of 17 countries in MENA.  Then, we explore 
heterogeneity in the region by specifically looking at GCC countries.   
The results in tables ( 3.1 – 3.2) shows significant difference in the rents-financial sector 
relationship linked with the institutional quality , especially for private credit and loan – deposit 
ratio as highlighted in columns (1) of table (3.1) and (3.2) respectively, as the coefficient on the 
interaction term enters negatively with a lower value and insignificantly.    
 
Table ( 3.1) : Quality of government and Financial Depth  
 
 
Private Credit M2 Liquid Liability 
(1) (2) (3)
Inflation -0.0280 -0.065*** -0.0954***
(0.0554) (0.0244) (0.0211)
Real GDP 1.422** 0.0107 0.105
(0.661) (0.225) (0.237)
Gov Exp 0.0895 0.875*** 0.647**
(0.766) (0.259) (0.242)
Investment -0.216 0.111 0.00603
(0.313) (0.104) (0.105)
Openess 0.417 0.344** 0.394**
(0.355) (0.130) (0.142)
School 1.074 0.257 0.107
(0.860) (0.206) (0.207)
QOG 1.055** 0.371** 0.167
(0.482) (0.138) (0.153)
Rents -0.146** -0.0818** -0.00661
(0.0666) (0.0339) (0.0340)
QOG * Rents -0.107* -0.000760 0.0205
(0.0591) (0.0280) (0.0289)
Constant -5.396 -1.994 -1.629
(6.897) (2.713) (2.329)
Observations 78 89 84
R-squared 0.250 0.395 0.431
Number of Countries 17 17 17
Explanantory Variables 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** Statistically significant 1%, ** Statistically 
Significant at 5%, * statistically Significant at 10 %
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Starting with financial depth in table (3.1), schooling and investment have lost significance for 
private credit and M2. Institutions could have overridden their importance as the quality of 
government is highly significant and has a positive effect specially on private credit and a lower 
effect in magnitude on M2, with significance level of 5% but no effect on liquid liability. The 
point estimates of resource rents is -0.146 and -0.0818 on private capital and M2 which is 
statistically significant at 5% and slightly higher than the specification without institutions. The 
interaction term ( QOG * Rents) shows inconsistency in magnitude and significance between 
variables; for private capital, the effect is negative and significance with an estimate of -0.107% 
while negative and insignificant for M2, and insignificantly positive for Liquid liability. Holding 
other control variables constant, an increase in institutional quality by 1% is associated with an 
increase in private credit by 1.05% and 0.37% in M2.   
 
To summarize, institutions slightly change the marginal effect of resource dependence on 
financial sector activity especially private credit expansion. Countries that are highly dependent 
on resource rents as a percentage of GDP  tend to have a less damaging effect on financial depth 
conditional on better quality of government as captured by the lower coefficient of the 
interaction term. High quality institutions are crucial for financial sector to enforce law and 
protect creditors’ rights. 
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Regarding other aspects of the financial sector, in tables (3.2) we show estimation results for 
financial efficiency
20
.  
 
Table (3.2) : Quality of Government and Financial Efficiency  
 
We find that there is inconsistency in significance and sign for some of the explanatory variables 
as inflation, real GDP per capita and trade openness. Higher inflation generates excess liquidity 
but increases efficiency. Investment is consistently positive and significant with more effect on 
banks spread. More investment stimulates demand for financial services, spurring competition 
among banks and enhancing efficiency.  
                                                             
20 We do not test the effect on financial institution stability as the number of observations available is quite small ( 
46 observations only) , and hence when the model is run, all variables are jointly insignificant, thus this variable is 
dropped from analysis.   
Loan - Deposit Spread
(1) (2)
Inflation -0.0714*** 0.374
(0.0206) (0.234)
Real GDP 0.164 -3.776***
(0.285) (1.135)
Gov Exp 1.307*** 0.0731
(0.302) (0.964)
Investment 0.277** 1.051***
(0.113) (0.297)
Openess 0.528*** -0.421
(0.122) (0.957)
School 0.340 4.367***
(0.243) (1.361)
QOG 0.0210 1.511
(0.132) (1.087)
Rents -0.078*** 0.0289
(0.0226) (0.163)
QOG * Rents -0.074* -0.291
(0.0408) (0.196)
Constant -2.782 30.38**
(2.815) (10.80)
Observations 76 63
R-squared 0.598 0.462
Number of Countries 15 15
Explanatory Variables
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** statistically significant at 
1%, ** Statistically significant at 5%, * Statistically significant at 10 %
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The quality of institutions is not significant for intermediation efficiency measures, yet is still 
positive and higher for spread. Resource rents are significant at 1% with point estimate of -0.078 
on loan-deposit ratio which is slightly lower in the specification without institutions. However, 
when institutions interact with resource rents , the coefficient  is negatively significant and has a 
smaller marginal effect on loan deposit ratio while no effect on spread. The change of impact of 
rents on banks efficiency in the presence of better institutions is very small.  
 
We can conclude from this section, that in general there is no strong evidence that cross-country 
differences in quality of institutions significantly affect the marginal impact that natural resource 
rent has on financial efficiency but a strong impact on financial sector depth within the context of 
our sample size limitation and period of study. The insignificance of the interaction term is 
interpreted as indicating that quality of government does not have a favorable impact on the 
adverse role of resource rents on efficiency.  
 
The now proceed to tackle the heterogeneity in country specific characteristics. As we mentioned 
earlier, we expect some differences between GCC and rest of MENA , hence we conduct the 
same analysis as before but using a dummy variable for GCC countries and constructing two 
interaction variables, (Gcc*Rents) and ( Gcc*Qog)
21
 following Barajas et al. (2012). Tables (3.3) 
and (3.4) show the estimation results for financial depth and efficiency. Such that, columns (a) 
show the first interaction term to test if rents effect on financial depth is different in GCC than in 
all the region without the institutional variable. Columns (b) introduces the quality of 
government variable  and column (c) presents the full specification with the two interaction 
variables.  
 
Starting with table (3.3), The negative effect of resource rents is more pronounced in GCC than 
in the rest of the region. The coefficient on the interaction of rents with the GCC dummy is more 
negative, but is only significant for M2. An increase in rents share of GDP by 1% is associated 
with a drop of M2 by 0.086% in the whole region compared to 0.311% in GCC. Quality of 
government does not seem to have an effect on any of the financial indicators as it is  statistically 
                                                             
21 It is not possible to just use the GCC countries in the regression as there are only 6 countries in this sub-group. 
Thus for sample size constraints and for comparability purposes , it was better to run the model with the 
interaction term.  
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insignificant in MENA, yet it is positive. This is contrary to our results interpreted earlier from 
table (3.1). However, it is statistically significant at 10% level in GCC countries for M2 and 
liquid liability as in columns (2c) and (3c) with a positive correlation of 0.857% increase in M2 
and 0.7246% increase in liquid liability in GCC compared to 0.655% increase and 0.631% in all 
MENA.  
Exploring the last specification of this section, where loan-deposit ratio and spread are the 
dependent variables, is shown in table (3.4). Resource rents are negative but insignificant for 
neither variables. Besides, the interaction term with GCC is surprisingly positive and 
insignificant. Institutional quality is statistically significant at 5% on loan-deposit ratio only and 
is higher for GCC compared to the whole region, such that there is a 1.25% increase in deposit 
ratio in GCC compared to 0.411%  for a one percentage increase in institutional quality as shown 
in column (1c).    
 The overall conclusion from the last section is that, a better quality of government is more 
important for a sound financial sector in general; particularly so for GCC than for the whole 
MENA region. This is intuitive, as the negative effect of resource rents is more pronounced in 
GCC due to their oil and mineral wealth. The size and activity of the financial sector is expanded 
in the presence of higher quality institutions in GCC. In addition, it is statistically significant at 
5% on loan-deposit ratio (measuring efficiency) and is higher for GCC compared to the whole 
region.  
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Table ( 3.3) : Institutions and Financial Depth in GCC : 
 
 
 
 
 
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3a) (3b) (3c)
Inflation -0.0141 -0.037 -0.0404 -0.0269 -0.0477* -0.0396 -0.0594 -0.0919*** -0.0824**
(0.0934) (0.0966) (0.105) (0.0268) (0.0263) (0.0291) (0.0391) (0.0255) (0.0286)
Real GDP 1.243 1.129 1.207 0.0608 -0.129 -0.0892 0.226 0.00462 0.0561
(0.809) (0.674) (0.700) (0.240) (0.214) (0.205) (0.325) (0.289) (0.290)
Gov Exp 0.537* 0.263 0.281 0.805** 0.856** 0.753** 0.386 0.478* 0.344
(0.296) (0.246) (0.259) (0.354) (0.339) (0.319) (0.290) (0.270) (0.224)
Rents -0.105* -0.0367 -0.093* -0.086** -0.00680 -0.097*** -0.0209 -0.0167 -0.0154
(0.0621) (0.0524) (0.0516) (0.0349) (0.0365) (0.0373) (0.0301) (0.0318) (0.0324)
Investment 0.313 0.375 0.621* 0.0418 0.139 0.180* 0.0021 0.0335 0.0804
(0.293) (0.346) (0.348) (0.0962) (0.0943) (0.100) (0.134) (0.111) (0.112)
Openess 0.441 0.396 0.384 0.332** 0.299** 0.308** 0.422** 0.369** 0.373**
(0.413) (0.365) (0.357) (0.135) (0.131) (0.123) (0.145) (0.149) (0.144)
School 0.222 0.381 0.409 0.174 0.242 0.190 0.374 0.349 0.181
(0.877) (0.877) (0.942) (0.230) (0.214) (0.198) (0.281) (0.262) (0.261)
Gcc * Rents -0.428 -0.537 -0.682 -0.225* 0.0608 -0.423* -0.236 -0.112 -0.369*
(0.579) (0.603) (0.689) (0.206) (0.235) (0.242) (0.231) (0.214) (0.211)
Gcc* QOG -1.680 0.655* 0.631*
(1.476) (0.361) (0.371)
QOG 0.600 0.809 0.0997 0.202 0.0087 0.0936
(0.510) (0.642) (0.155) (0.171) (0.177) (0.191)
Constant -5.295 -3.493 -3.377 -1.925 -0.748 -0.705 -0.801 0.406 0.491
(6.938) (5.501) (5.542) (2.636) (2.481) (2.302) (2.202) (2.195) (1.979)
Observations 79 79 79 91 90 90 86 85 85
R-squared 0.191 0.236 0.265 0.344 0.355 0.401 0.358 0.380 0.418
Number of Countries 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Explanantory Variables 
Private Credit M2 Liquid Liability 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** Statistically Significant at 1%, ** Statistically Significant at 5%, * Statistically significant at 10%
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Table (3.4): Institutions Financial Efficiency in GCC     
 
 
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Inflation -0.0751** -0.0703** -0.0624* 0.412 0.379 0.321
(0.0301) (0.0311) (0.0308) (0.242) (0.272) (0.248)
Real GDP 0.0805 0.0595 0.114 -2.566** -3.972*** -4.399***
(0.341) (0.322) (0.319) (1.083) (1.132) (1.043)
Gov Exp 0.193 0.181 0.0864 0.340 0.499 1.141
(0.331) (0.351) (0.229) (1.232) (1.183) (0.975)
Investment 0.0113 0.0292 0.0662 0.471 1.021*** 0.914**
(0.106) (0.111) (0.102) (0.291) (0.329) (0.375)
Openess 0.515*** 0.508*** 0.504*** 0.486 0.528 0.461
(0.136) (0.129) (0.126) (0.971) (0.880) (0.921)
School 0.415 0.399 0.317 3.781** 4.449*** 4.890***
(0.287) (0.288) (0.286) (1.465) (1.349) (1.301)
QOG 0.488*** 0.411** 1.231 0.812
(0.129) (0.149) (0.986) (0.915)
Rents -0.123 -0.140 -0.227 -0.106 0.353 0.866
(0.193) (0.198) (0.205) (0.641) (1.068) (1.068)
Gcc* Rents 0.00710 0.00936 0.0115 -0.0111 0.112 0.120
(0.0187) (0.0176) (0.0178) (0.145) (0.139) (0.121)
Gcc * QOG 0.804** 3.498**
(0.368) (1.602)
Constant -0.616 -0.308 -0.333 15.02 27.59** 28.78**
(2.618) (2.478) (2.198) (8.596) (10.30) (9.750)
Observations 77 77 77 64 63 63
R-squared 0.571 0.575 0.607 0.393 0.442 0.494
Number of Countries 15 15 15 15 15 15
Explanatory Variables
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** statistically significant at 1%, ** Statistically significant at 5%,                                              
* Statistically significant at 10%
Deposit Spread
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5. Conclusions  
The paper empirically investigated a thus far  neglected channel through which natural resources 
might affect MENA economic growth through a deterioration in the financial sector. The paper 
analyzed two inextricably intertwined broader issues. First, the impact of natural resource 
dependence and abundance on financial intermediaries’ depth, efficiency and stability. Second, 
the role of good quality institutions in affecting the relationship between resource dependence 
and financial development. We covered 17 countries from the MENA region due to data 
availability for the period 1980-2009. Our empirical model is built on a fixed effect estimator 
and focuses on three aspects of the financial sector as the dependent variables , several measures 
of resource dependence and one measure of resource abundance as the independent variables. In 
addition, we controlled for standard factors associated with financial development across 
countries, like income per capita, trade openness, inflation, government size and schooling. The 
results obtained in this cross-country study have to be considered with cautious as they represent 
averages among countries. Potential measurement error and endogeneity of some variables could 
affect the result. Other techniques like the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM ) by Arellano 
and Bond ( 1991) is suitable to deal with problem of endogeneity in cross country regressions; it 
is built on using lagged values of independent variable as instruments. We could not use this 
method as it requires large number of observations which is not available for our sample.  
This section summarizes our main findings from the analysis to answer the main research 
questions:  
 
 Natural resource rents and oil rents as a percentage of GDP are the leading variables 
among natural resource indicators on financial depth with higher values of coefficients in 
the fixed OLS model compared to the pooled OLS estimates 
 
 More endowment in oil reserves is associated with lower level of credit to private sector 
and smaller size of the financial sector in general. This can be interpreted as the oil 
wealth acts as a disincentive to engage in the non resource sector due to resource rents 
which create low demand for external finance from commercial banks 
 
 Natural resource dependence variables are more negatively significant for banks 
efficiency but insignificant for stability. 
 
 There is weak channel between resource endowment and banks efficiency and stability,  
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 Regarding the marginal effect of better institutions, there is significant difference in the 
rents-financial sector relationship linked with the institutional quality, especially for 
private credit and loan – deposit ratio. However, the change of impact of resource rents 
on banks efficiency in the presence of better institutions is very small 
 
 A better quality of government is more important for GCC than for the whole region for a 
sound financial sector in general. The size and activity of the financial sector is expanded 
in the presence of higher quality institutions in GCC as well as increased efficiency. 
 
From the previous points, we conclude that the there is a resource curse in financial development 
in MENA for the period 1980-2009. The extent and significance can differ depending on the 
resource measure we use as dependent variable , and the financial indicator as independent 
variable. Measures of financial depth (especially private credit and M2) are more adversely 
affected by resource dependence than measures of financial efficiency and stability.  
 Moreover,  as a step beyond the analysis, we also found that it is clearly indicated that GCC 
countries suffer more negative effects of resource rents, being major oil and mineral producers.  
Better institutional quality of government is more likely to reduce the unfavorable effect on the 
size and soundness of the financial sector, hence it plays an important in the interacting 
relationship between resource dependence and financial sector by fostering contract 
enforcements and emphasizing government accountability.   
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Appendix:  
Figure ( 1A) : Genuine Saving Rate by Regions   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure ( 2A) : Total Natural Resource Rents ( % GDP ) across Regions ( 1980 -2010): 
 
 
    Source: World Development Indicators, 2012.
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Rents, % 
GDP 
FuelExp OilReserves Private M2 LIQLIA Deposit spread zscore Qog Polity2
RealGDP/ 
capita , 
USDDescriptive Statistics 
Mean 2.27E+01 50.36094 3.25E+07 40.5691 59.54865 55.6588 45.25258 8.28713 21.6834 0.524008 2.675741 16387.46
Std. Dev. 1.81E+01 40.01189 6.11E+07 22.7263 24.54147 23.47286 22.7512 27.6336 11.741 0.115204 2.239368 18299.22
Min 0.0076816 0.0039698 0 4.62351 20.78909 14.98558 9.137694 0.3 0.76057 0.201389 0.25 533.3752
Max 6.11E+01 99.21243 2.65E+08 90.2614 132.314 118.6766 97.39084 218.979 47.5759 0.820139 9.583334 96283.38
Obs 98 95 102 80 98 95 78 70 48 98 100 102
Correlations 
Rents, % GDP 1
FuelExp 0.8915 1
OilReserves, per 1000 0.5972 0.4721 1
Private -0.4802 -0.6873 0.0167 1
M2 -0.6646 -0.7493 -0.1021 0.7827 1
LIQLIA -0.7221 -0.7962 -0.1343 0.7532 0.9864 1
Deposit -0.5438 -0.672 0.0296 0.8953 0.9469 0.922 1
spread -0.3489 -0.3669 -0.3692 0.1301 0.0867 0.1215 0.0896 1
zscore -0.4045 -0.5393 -0.1468 0.4177 0.4193 0.436 0.4143 0.4589 1
Qog -0.4634 -0.6757 -0.0112 0.7386 0.4895 0.5106 0.5806 0.1392 0.1406 1
Polity2 -0.4566 -0.4563 -0.1015 0.5289 0.3602 0.3761 0.4212 -0.0329 0.1512 0.5245 1
RealGDP/ capita  USD 0.5015 0.2703 0.7798 0.3609 -0.0266 -0.0808 0.2123 -0.3109 -0.1981 0.3839 0.1924 1
Table 1A: Summary Statistics and Correlations 
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Table 2A:  GCC Summary Statistics  
 
Table 3A: Non GCC : Arab Mediterranean Summary Statistics  
 
 
Figure 3A: Correlations between Resource Rents and selected financial indicators:  
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Figure 4A : Correlations Oil Rent( % GDP) and selected financial indicators:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5A : Correlations Oil Reserves and selected financial indicators
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